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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2287 
__________ 
 
DONALD J. SIMMONS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN DAVID PIERCE; DR. MARC RICHMAN; DR. WILLIAM LYNCH; 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; CONNECTION CORRECTIONS 
HEALTHCARE; MATTHEW WOFFORD 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-00847) 
District Judge:  Honorable Colm F. Connolly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 4, 2020 
Before:  SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 4, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Donald Simmons, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
District Court’s order dismissing his complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.   
 Simmons filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the District Court 
screened and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A, giving Simmons 
leave to amend.  In his amended complaint against the Delaware Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”), a private healthcare provider, and several prison officials, 
including the prison warden, the Director of Healthcare Services at the prison, and two 
administrators employed by the healthcare provider, Simmons alleged that he saw a 
nurse, who treated him and recommended that he see a provider.  Some months later, he 
was seen by a doctor, who provided medication and treatment for a shoulder problem.  
Simmons was later seen by an outside specialist.  Simmons contended that he continues 
to suffer severe pain as a result of the DOC’s failure to promptly treat his condition, 
which violated his Eighth Amendment rights.1   
The District Court dismissed the amended complaint as legally frivolous pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1), stating that Simmons failed to cure the 
same defects that were present in the original complaint.  Namely, Simmons failed to 
state a claim because he did not refer to “any individuals, when the alleged refusal to treat 
the condition occurred, or whether Plaintiff has received treatment.”  ECF No. 12 at 1.  
 
1 The amended complaint superseded the original and rendered the original complaint a 
“nullity.”  See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017).  
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The District Court also noted that the complaint referred to acts that are time-barred.  
This appeal ensued.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We construe Simmons’s pro se 
complaint liberally.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We 
review the order dismissing the amended complaint under the same de novo standard of 
review as with our review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Even assuming that Simmons’s claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, 
his amended complaint is too sparse to state a claim.  To set forth a cognizable Eighth 
Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a prisoner must allege (1) a serious 
medical need and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate 
indifference to that need.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  A prison official 
is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 
serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm.  Farmer v. Brennan, 
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  Liability, however, cannot be grounded solely on the doctrine 
of respondeat superior; the officials must have had personal involvement in the alleged 
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violation.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Allegations of 
personal involvement must be made with “appropriate particularity.”  Id.   
Simmons failed to allege how any of the named defendants were personally 
involved in his medical care.  Simmons claimed that he was seen by an unnamed nurse, 
and, after a delay of months, was also seen by an unnamed physician.  Though Simmons 
claimed that the defendants generally were responsible for overseeing different aspects of 
the private healthcare provider’s functions, there were no allegations that any of the 
defendants participated or acquiesced in the delay in treating his shoulder.  In short, 
because Simmons did not allege personal involvement with “appropriate particularity” 
and the claims sound solely in respondeat superior,2 the District Court did not err in 
dismissing the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.3   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
2 To the extent that Simmons challenges an institutional policy under which inmates are 
required to obtain “prior approval” before being treated by a specialist, he has not stated 
how that policy might have caused the alleged constitutional violations.  See Natale v. 
Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003).  As Simmons concedes, it 
is not clear that the delay in his treatment was caused by a failure to obtain the requisite 
approval.  
 
3 In his brief, in addition to asserting that he stated a claim, Simmons argues that the 
District Court should have appointed counsel to assist him.  However, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel for Simmons.  See Tabron v. 
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).  
